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Learning from  Secularism 
Alexander Jensen 
The Uniting Church lives within a world-wide fellowship of  Churches in which it will learn to sharpen 
its understanding of  the will and purpose of  God by contact with contemporary thought. Within that 
fellowship the Uniting Church also stands in relation to contemporary societies in ways which will help 
it to understand its own nature and mission. 
1 
Arguably the most immediate context in which the Uniting Church lives, together with all other 
Churches in Australia, is the secular society. However, as far as I am aware, there is not much serious 
engagement with this-indeed, one hears all sorts of  statements made about the secular or 'postmodern' 
society in Church circles, at presbyteries and synods, board and commission meetings and in everyday 
talk among Church people. Usually these are woefully ill-informed and rarely rise above the cliche. 
Yes, it is true that people tend not to go to church, that they are suspicious of organised forms 
of  religion, that they are individualistic, often consumerist and do not like to commit to anything. 
However, these are only superficial observations that do not engage with the phenomenon of  secularity 
at any depth. Yet once we do engage with secular society at a more profound level, we will gain 
important insight into the nature of  this society, its weaknesses and inner contradictions, which, as 
Christians, we need to identify and expose. This is an important starting point for mission in our age. 
At the same time, we will also find important strengths, and good reasons for the rejection of  many 
forms of  religion. This needs to be the starting point for critical self-reflection within the Church. 
All this certainly presupposes that we want to engage with our surrounding culture critically. The 
Christian religion is remarkably good at adapting itself to new environments, and thus we see Christian 
Churches that have embraced modernirf lock, stock and barrel, and become very successful. Micklethwait 
and Woolridge's recent book God is Back describes what thoroughly modern Christianity looks like, 
which is  the American style Pentecostal Church, led by an entrepreneurial pastor and catering for a 
congregation of  individualistic adherents.3 
However, I believe that we are called to be critical of our modern secular society and of its roots, 
because the Gospel needs to transform society. We are called to test everything and only hold on to 
what is good. Besides, I always find it deeply embarrassing when I see congregations trying to emulate 
Pentecostal elements in their worship. This hardly goes beyond badly played rock music with appalling 
lyrics and a dumbing down of  the Christian Gospel. 
Basis of Union,  §11 
I use this term  in the temporal sense-for the purposes of this paper I am  not distinguishing between modernity and  so-called 'post-
modernity'. 
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In this paper, I shall present an outline of  a possible critical engagement with modern secular culture. 
This will be, obviously, far  from complete, and merely raise questions and point in the direction of 
possible discussions. So, first I shall ask what we actually mean by 'secularisation' and by 'secular society'. 
This will give us an entry point into the fascinating discussion of  secularisation that has been taking 
place in philosophy, law and theology since the early twentieth century. Second, I shall describe some 
features of  secularisation which have been identified in this debate. This will be followed by an outline 
of  possible consequences for Church and theology, both in relation to society and to the Church's self-
criticism and ongoing reformation. Finally, I shall describe possible responses to the phenomenon of 
modern secular society. 
The Secularisation Debate 
The notion that the world is moving in the direction of  an increasingly secular society is  as  old as 
the enlightenment. Social, scientific and philosophical progress was supposed to enable humankind to 
be released from its self-imposed tutelage.4 In the early twentieth century the awareness grew that the 
relation between the older religious world view and features of  modern society was more complex. For 
example Max Weber argued famously that modern capitalist economy had its origin in the Protestant 
work ethic.5 
A new dimension of understanding secular society was opened by the German legal scholar Carl 
Schmitt. In 1922, Schmitt published a short book called Political1heology in which he developed his 
understanding of  sovereignty. In this text he suggested that the modern state is a secularised version of 
the mediaeval concept of  the omnipotent God. In fact, Schmitt argued that 'all significant concepts of 
the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.'
6  Consequently, he implied that 
secular society actually contained in itself a vital remnant of  religious thinking. Some twenty-seven years 
later, Karl Lowith broadened this thesis and argued that modernity was in fact the secularisation of 
Christian ideals.? Instead of  being something new that had completely replaced the old religious world 
view, modernity was seen as the illegitimate heir to theology's intellectual property.  Consequently, it 
was argued that secular society was not quite as secular as its proponents thought, for at its very heart 
religion lurked unrecognised. 
Martin Heidegger added an important dimension to this debate when, in his writings on Nietzsche, he 
argued that there was a deep flaw within Western theological thinking since Plato and Aristotle, namely 
the shift towards onto-theological understanding of  being, which led inevitably to atheism and nihilism.  8 
4  Immanuel  Kant, 'What Is Enlightenment?' in Philosophical Writings, ed. Ernst Behler, New York, Continuum, 1986, p. 263. 
5  Max Weber,  The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London, Unwin Hyman, 1989. 
6  Carl Schmitt,  Political Theology,  Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab,  Chicago,  University of Chicago 
Press, 2005, p. 36. 
7  In particular in Karl Lowith, Meaning in History, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949. 
8  Martin Heidegger, 'Nietzsche's Word: "God Is Dead'", in Off the Beaten Track,  Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002. LEARNING FROM SECULARISM  23 
Thus secular society (which Heidegger links with atheism and nihilism), far from being an advance over 
against earlier world views, is in fact the result of  a wrong development, of  an intellectual deviation. 
This view of modernity has become very influential, with the one difference that the deviation is 
most often located in late mediaeval Nominalism. This view was introduced into the discussion by the 
German philosopher Hans Blumenberg in his The Legitimacy of  the Modern Age. First of  all, Blumenberg 
put forward a way of  understanding what constituted secularisation and, consequently, of  the relation 
between religious and secular concepts. He suggested that 
what mainly occurred in the process that is interpreted as secularisation ... should be described 
not as the transposition of  authentically theological contents into secularized alienation from 
their origin, but rather as the reoccupation of  answer positions that have become vacant and 
whose corresponding questions could not be eliminated.9 
In other words, far from being the illegitimate heir to theology's intellectual property, as implied by 
Schmitt's and Lowith's theories, the secular age has provided new answers for questions that humankind 
has  always asked,  and for which mediaeval theological answers did not carry weight any longer. In 
particular, Blumenberg identified late mediaeval Nominalism as the driving force behind this change-
unwittingly, obviously. Against the mediaeval consensus that God's actions were always guided by reason, 
the Nominalists insisted on the absolute freedom of  God.
10 This insistence on the unfettered absolute 
power of  God undermined the notion of  the world as cosmos which is governed by reason and created 
and designed for the benefit of  humankind, because to insist that God must be guided by reason and 
human flourishing would limit God's freedom-why should God be bound by such considerations? 
Consequently, God had to be seen as radically free, even on the danger that God could become potentially 
capricious and unreliable. The basic question, 'How can we make sense of  the world in which we live?' 
remained, but the earlier mediaeval answer that a rational God was the guarantor of  a rational universe 
and of  a hospitable world order was not an option any longer. To fill this vacuum-or, in Blumenberg's 
terminology, the 'vacant answer position-humankind had to find a new way of  asserting its position 
in a potentially hostile universe.
11  Blumenberg traced this development and argued that the Baconian 
programme of  scientific advance and the Cartesian grounding of  certain knowledge in the autonomous 
human reason filled this gap.
12 
Blumenberg's argument is more nuanced and balanced than this simplified summary, but this will 
suffice to convey an idea of  the direction of  his thinking. At any rate, the notion of  Christian theology 
rejecting the possibility of  any rational explanation of  the world as a major contributing factor in the 
9 
Hans  Blumenberg,  The  Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans.  Robert M. Wallace,  Studies  in  Contemporary  German  Social Thought. 
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1983, p. 65. 
10 
Blumenberg,  The  Legitimacy of the Modern Age,  pp.  171-179. See  also  David  Knowles,  The  Evolution of Medieval  Thought,  2 ed., 
London; New York, Longman, 1988, pp. 328-29. I use 'Nominalism' in the wider sense, synonymous with Okhamism and  via moderna. 
11 
Blumenberg,  The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, pp.  138, 151. 
12 
For Francis Bacon see Blumenberg,  The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, pp. 383-90. For Rene Descartes see pp. 181-203. 24  UNITING CHURCH STUDIES 
rise of  secular modernity is remarkable and we will need to keep this in mind for later. 
More recently, Michael Gillespie presented an analysis leading to similar conclusions in his work The 
Theological Origins of  Modernity, 
13 in which he argues with Blumenberg that modernity is the result of  the 
collapse of  mediaeval philosophy and theology as a result of  Nominalism, but also, against Blumenberg, 
that modernity does not exist by its own right, but remains parasitical on the theology from which 
it originated. Unfortunately, there is no space to include a discussion of  his perspective in this paper. 
The next author whom I would like to discuss in detail is Charles Taylor and his recent seminal work 
A Secular Age. There are three elements of  Taylor's argument which we need to discuss. First, Taylor 
defines what 'secular society' actually means in a simple and useful way. Then, he describes the genesis 
of secular society, focussing not on the 'intellectual deviation story' (this is actually Taylor's phrase14) 
on which I have focussed so  far,  but the 'reform master narrative'.  Finally,  I shall describe Taylor's 
understanding of  the legitimacy of  secular society. I shall present a brief  outline of  these three elements 
here and return to them in the discussion of  the next section. 
First, Taylor proposes three different definitions of  secular society, which, in their difference, complement 
one another and can be applied in different circumstances. The most potent, which is the main focus of 
Taylor's study, is that 'secular' means the change 'which takes us from a society in which it was virtually 
impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human 
possibility among others.'15 
Taylor goes on to describe the genesis of  this society in terms of the religious reform narrative. He 
summarises this with admirable clarity and brevity: 
Briefly summed up, the Reform demanded that everyone be a real,  I 00 percent Christian. 
Reform not only disenchants, but disciplines  and re-orders life  and society.  Along with 
civility, this mal<.es for a notion of  moral order which gives a new sense to Christianity, and 
the demands of  faith. This collapses the distance of  faith from Christendom. It introduces an 
anthropocentric shift, and hence a break-out from the monopoly Christian faith. 16 
In other words, the religious reform movement, the beginning of  which he locates in the demand by 
the fourth Lateran Council of  1215 that every Christian should go to confession at least once a year, 17 
attempted to impose greater commitment of  all members of  the Church, stronger religious devotion, 
improved piety and stricter Christian morality. 18 In addition, this movement tried to suppress superstition 
13  Michael Allen Gillespie,  The Theological Origins of  Modernity, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
14  Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 774. 
15  Taylor, A Secular Age, p.  3. 
16  Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 774. Italics and capitalisation of 'Reform' in the original. 
17  Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 64. 
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and folk religion,  thus contributing significantly to the disenchantment of the world. This reform 
movement continued, in only slightly different forms, in the three main streams of  the Reformation, 
i.e. the Lutheran, Calvinist and Roman Catholic Reformations, and then, within these traditions, into 
the modern age. 
Taylor traces the genesis of  this society, its features, and the contradictions and cross pressures that its 
members face (I shall discuss Taylor's notion of'cross pressures' below.) He contends that the development 
towards secularism was by no means inevitable, and that at many junctions a different turn could have 
been taken, which would have led to a very different society. 19 
Finally, Taylor also agrees with Blumenberg (although hardly mentioning him at all)  that modern 
secular society is not merely living from the spoils of  the demise of Christendom, but that something 
genuinely new and legitimate evolved, which, eventually, replaced the old world order. However, because 
of the cross pressures which the modern secular self faces,  he believes that secular modernity is by far 
not as powerful and pervasive as it is commonly assumed. 
This description consists, obviously, only of  sketches of the profound contributions to the debate 
about the origin and nature of secular modernity. However, they point, I hope, to the complexity of 
the various contributors to the development of  modern secular society. 
What is Secular Society? 
In this section, I will discuss the key elements of  secular society. In this, I will address the three areas 
under which I have summarised Taylor's proposal, but in slightly different order-I shall discuss the 
origin first, then the features of  secular society and then its legitimacy and limitations. Although Taylor 
will feature prominently in this section, I will not restrict myself to him but also engage other authors 
where appropriate. 
Origins of  Secular Modernity 
First of  all, the roots of  modern secular society are theological, in particular drawing on the western 
Christian tradition. In fact,  it is  a phenomenon that could only arise within the context of western 
Christianity. I have already mentioned above the theory that it was the insistence on God's radical 
freedom that undermined the mediaeval understanding of a cosmos ruled and governed by God's 
reason. In response to this crisis of  late mediaeval thought certain modern positions developed, such 
as the primacy of the autonomous rational self (Descartes) and the need for a systematic programme 
of technological progress (Bacon). In short, the theological absolutism of  Nominalist theology led to 
human self-assertion, to use Blumenberg's terminology. 
Another important factor is the shift from analogical to univocal language in relation to the divine. 
19  Taylor, A Secular Age, pp. ZD-ZZ.  See alsop. 95. 26  UNITING CHURCH STUDIES 
In short, equivocal and analogical language in relation to God's being expresses that God is qualitatively 
different from any other being, to the extent that one even has to say that God is  not a being at all, 
rather beyond being and, at the same time, the source of all being. Duns Scotus shifted theological 
language and introduced univocal language in relation to God's being.
20 This means that 'being' means 
that same when applied to God as when applied to Socrates (or any other creature). The difference 
between God's and Socrates' being is that Socrates is a finite being, while God is an infinite being. The 
distinction between finite and infinite being, however,  does not invalidate the univocal attribution. 
The same applies to transcendental terms, such as 'God is good'. This means that God is good in the 
same sense as Socrates is good, however God much more so than Socrates or any other creature. 
21 This 
move was followed by William of  Ockham and with him by the largest part of  the late mediaeval and 
modern theological tradition. This move meant that God's being is not totally different from the being 
of  anything else that exists. God may be the highest and infinite being, but God is still a being, that is 
one thing that exists. Consequently, God's transcendence is severely diminished, because God is one 
being, albeit an infinite being, among beings. This makes it easier and potentially even necessary to deny 
the existence of  God. For example, and I put the argument deliberately crudely here, if  we take seriously 
Ockham's razor, i.e. the notion that 'entities [beings] are not be multiplied beyond necessity', 
22 and God 
is a being as any other being, then we must admit that, if  the universe can be explained without God, 
God's existence must not be assumed. 
It is likely, although I do not have the space to discuss this at this point, that this concept of  God's 
existence led to the 'God of  the gaps', who is used to explain what cannot otherwise be explained, until 
this gap is closed by scientific progress and another gap has to be found. The intelligent design debate, 
which we witnessed a few years ago, is an excellent example. However, this leads to a permanent retreat 
from formerly held positions and the search for a new fallback position. This is neither a stable position 
nor intellectually satisfying. 
These two moves, together with a number of  other factors which are beyond the scope of  this paper, 
led to the development of  secularism and to atheism becoming a viable alternative to belief in God. It 
must also be noted, though, that these developments were not inevitable or linear. On the contrary, as 
Taylor points out, they were contingent and could have moved into a different direction at every turn. 
Consequently, Taylor concludes that the master narrative of modern secularism is  deeply flawed.  In 
short, this narrative assumes that religion, which is by definition obscure, sectarian and superstitious, 
has been gradually pushed out of  Western society by scientific and social advance.23 This narrative is 
widely believed, but highly inaccurate. The secular narrative ignores, Taylor argues, the contingency of 
these developments, and also that religion has shown itself to be highly adaptable to change in the social 
20  Stephen  P.  Menn, 'Metaphysics: God and Being',  in  The  Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy,  ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.  163. 
21  John Milbank,  Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, Signposts in Theology, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 1990, pp. 302-3. 
22  Alan  Baker,  'Simplicity',  in  The  Stanford Encyclopedia  of Philosphy,  ed  Edward  N.  Zalta.  (2010),  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
spr201 0/entries/simplicity/. 
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and intellectual climate-the many revivals of the ninetieth century, both evangelical and Catholic, 
bear witness to this. And the enormous growth of Pentecostal religion world-wide demonstrates this 
in our own time. 
In sum, secularity and atheism are by far not the natural human attitude. On the contrary, they 
developed on the basis of theological presuppositions and were never able to shed their theological 
inheritance, as Gillespie argued in his  The Theological Origins of  Modernity. 24 If  we scratch secular thought 
at the surface, we will find theological motifs and thought forms. Consequently, secular modernity is 
unthinkable without specific western Christian theological presuppositions. Against the notion that 
secularity and atheism are inevitable and natural stands Taylor's strong argument that its development 
was by no means necessary, but the result of  contingent developments, which therefore could also have 
moved into a different direction. And the fact that religion is on the rise everywhere except Western 
Europe and Australia makes this assumption even more implausible. 
Features of  Secular Modernity 
The society that has grown out of these developments displays certain distinct features, which are 
not all necessarily obvious. One of  the more obvious ones is that the denial of  the existence of  God has 
not only become a viable viewpoint, but also one which is considered superior to its alternatives. Other 
features include the development of the 'buffered self' and the reduction of the purpose of human 
society to the mutual benefit of  its members. 
Taylor uses  the term 'buffered self' in order to describe what he sees as  the condition of modern 
human existence. The 'buffered self' goes hand in hand with the disenchantment of the world. In the 
old enchanted world the human person was subject to all kinds of  supernatural influences-demons, 
angels and saints, to name but a few. 25 Praying to the good forces would help in adversity, while offending 
them or coming in contact with evil forces would bring calamity. Illness could be the result of  demon 
possession, a spell cast by a witch, or the result of  God's anger because of  a hidden sin. For example, 
melancholy and depression were seen as the result of  a spiritus tristitiae, a spirit of  sadness that possesses 
the depressed person.26 Consequently, the boundary between the 'inner self' and the outside was porous, 
as outside agencies could influence the inner quite profoundly. Because of  this porous boundary, Taylor 
calls this attitude the 'porous self'.  27 Within the framework of  the porous self, meanings and power do 
not exclusively reside in the mind, but also in things or objects.
28 
The modern disenchanted world does not know any such supernatural agency. Innerworldly events are 
usually attributed to natural causes. Illness is an organic phenomenon. And if  my inner self is affected 
24 
Gillespie,  The Theological Origins of Modernity, pp. 278-87. 
25 
Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 32. 
26 
So states Martin Luther in a letter to Hieronymus Weller in 1530. See Martin Luther, Luthers Werke, ed. Otto Clemen, Berlin, De Gruyter, 
1966, Vol.  6, pp. 283-85. 
27 
Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 38. 
28 
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by something that happens outside, then this is my reaction to the hurt, not the power of  an external 
force, that causes this.29  In other words, the boundary between the external world and the inner self 
is not porous anymore, but closed. Taylor calls this the 'buffered self'. This 'buffered self' can distance 
itself from everything outside the human mind, i.e. from forces that might affect the self All that counts 
is from within the self-purposes and meanings arise from within the self, not external agents.  30 Taylor 
offers a perceptive genealogy of the buffered self,  along the lines of the 'Reform Narrative' which I 
introduced earlier.31  The 'buffered self' brings with it a very different attitude to the sacred-religion 
is now internalised, independent of  places, times, practices and so forth. An interesting change is, for 
example, that sin is not an objective reality any longer, but arises within the self.3
2 
Taylor defines the purpose of modern secular society as  the provision of 'mutual benefit'. In this 
society, individuals come together (behind this stands the social contract theory of  society) in order to 
secure life, the means to life and freedom for its members, and that these benefits are secured for all 
members equally.33 This society requires a certain amount of  self-discipline of  its members, so that they 
can be productive and non-disruptive.34 
In sum, modern secular society is  based on an important shift in human self-understanding, the 
emergence of  the 'buffered self', which sees itself  as apart from creation and not influenced by supernatural 
powers. This new self is primarily an individual and only secondly a member of  a society. Society exists 
exclusively for the mutual benefit of its  members, without reference to any higher spiritual reality. 
Obviously, this description of the modern self in modern secular society is  sketchy to the extreme. 
However, it will suffice to give an impression ofTaylor's interpretation of  the secular society in which 
we live. It  is important to note that these features, which we usually take for granted, are not the natural 
human state, but the result of  historically contingent developments. To recognise this means that one 
is able to recognise the limits and contradictions within secular modernity. 
Legitimacy and Limits of  Secular Modernity 
This brings us to the discussion of  the legitimacy and limits of  modern secular society and the 'buffered 
self'. I am going to focus first on the legitimacy of  modern society, using the so-called 'Bockenforde-
dictum' about the deep contradiction at the heart of liberal society as  the starting point. I will then 
discuss briefly some of  the dilemmas which the modern self faces. 
In an essay first published in 1967 the German legal scholar and judge Ernst Wolfgang Bockenforde 
identified a deep contradiction at the very heart of  the modern secular state: 
29  Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 33. 
30  Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 38. 
31  See above p. 25. 
32  Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 39. 
33  Taylor, A Secular Age, p.  171. 
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the liberal secular state lives on premises that it cannot itself  guarantee . ... On the one hand, it 
can only survive as a liberal state if  the liberty it allows its citizens regulates itself from within 
on the basis of  the moral substance of  the individual and the homogeneity of  society. On the 
other hand, it cannot attempt to guarantee those inner regulatory forces by its own efforts 
... without abandoning its liberalness35 
29 
Or, to put is as a question, 'How far can nations united in states live by the guaranteed provision of 
individual liberty alone, without a unif}ring bond antecedent to that liberty?'36 1his common bond used 
to be provided by a sacral and religious view of  society, and later by the nation. The modern liberal state 
does not have any of  these common bonds at its disposal. So the state depends on these common bonds 
and common values, but cannot install or enforce them within its citizens. This is 'the great gamble' 
that Western society has made for liberty's sake. Bockenforde holds that this gamble is successful. And 
many agree. Jiirgen Habermas, for example, believes that the secular liberal society is so attractive that 
it will, in the end, win over everyone by its promise of  freedom and prosperity for all.37 However, I do 
not believe that this is borne out by experience. Increasing disengagement from the political process 
shows, in my opinion, that the benefits are taken for granted, while the cost of  liberty is ignored. At the 
same time, the liberal state is under pressure from religious fundamentalists, not only of the Islamist 
variety. I am not predicting the decline and fall ofWestern civilisation-I think it is far too resilient for 
this. Instead, these observations could be the starting point for a critical engagement with the society 
in which the Churches find themselves. 
Let us  continue with the dilemmas within which the modern self finds itself. I cannot mention all 
those that Taylor lists in two major chapters. So  I shall restrict myself to two points: first,  there is  a 
conflict between the felt need for transcendence, not necessarily of  a religious kind, and the needs of 
a society governed by instrumental reason. This goes together with dissatisfaction with the levelling 
down of emotions, heroism, sexuality and other elementary aspects of human existence.38 Second, I 
shall discuss briefly the problem of  the foundation of  secular morality. 
On the one hand, as Taylor points out, modern secular society is necessarily governed by instrumental 
reason, which is the way of  acting that 'works the system' effectively in order to bring about a desired 
result, that is, human flourishing.39 Taylor contends that in the activity of  human reason' ... the modern 
image of  human flourishing incorporates an activist, interventionist stance, both towards nature and to 
human society. Both are to be re-ordered, in the light of  instrumental reason, to suit human purposes.'
40 
35  Ernst Wolfgang Btickenftirde, State,  Society,  and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law,  New York,  Berg,  1991, p. 
45. 
36 
Btickenftirde, State,  Society, and Liberty,  p.  44. 
37  Jurgen Habermas and Benedict VI,  Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion, San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 2006, pp. 31-32. 
See also Taylor, A Secular Age, p.  507. 
38 
Taylor, A Secular Age, pp. 184-85, 414, 771. 
39 
Taylor, A Secular Age, pp. 98, 230. 
40 
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Thus society is merely a means to an end, without any intrinsic value. To live and to operate within this 
society requires the use of  instrumental reason, which tal<:es everything as an object in order to enhance 
human flourishing. 
On the other hand, Taylor identifies a deep need to seek deeper meaning in life, and to find this 
meaning elsewhere than in reason alone. Many 'are seeking a kind of  unity and wholeness of  the self, a 
reclaiming of  the place of  feeling, against the one-sided pre-eminence of  reason, and reclaiming the body 
and its pleasures from the inferior and often guilt-ridden place it has been allowed in the disciplined, 
instrumental identity.'41  Consequently, the secular order of  the world is not able to provide the depth 
which many people are seeking in life. 
Related to this are the cross pressures from which the modern self suffers. Taylor argues, and illustrates 
with many examples, that a majority of  people inhabit a middle position between full acceptance of  a 
transcendent reality and a purely immanent frame of  mind. This position is, however, hotly contested 
by both religion and atheism. On the one hand, strident secularists claim that this middle position is 
intellectually untenable, while, on the other hand, resurgent conservative and fundamentalist religion 
claims that this position is infidelity. Consequently, the modern individual finds him- or herself under 
serious cross pressures.42 
Second, Taylor points out the problem of the foundation of morality, in particular in cases where 
self-sacrifice is required. The immanent frame, according to Taylor, cannot maintain this. There may 
be a certain heroism in the stance of  Dr Rieux of  Albert Camus' La Peste, who, 'acts for the good of  his 
fellow creatures, in spite of  the absurd, even in the last instance, the ultimate futility of  all such action,' 
and we may admire this.  43  However, Taylor asks if the humanist heroism of Dr Rieux is enough of  a 
source for genuinely altruistic work for the fellow creature.  44 
Even in the short and superficial description of  only a few points made by scholars studying secular 
society we find a whole host of  starting points for a critical engagement with our immediate context, 
which we too often take for granted. 
Responses 
Consequently, if  we take the notion seriously that we learn by contact with contemporary thought 
and need to develop the understanding of  our nature and mission in relation to contemporary societies, 
then an in-depth engagement with secular society and the wide range of  literature on this is imperative 
41  Taylor, A Secular Age, p.  507. 
42  Taylor, A Secular Age, pp. 594--618. 
43  Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 600. 
44  Taylor. A Secular Age, p. 695. LEARNING FROM SECULARISM  31 
for the Uniting Church. Otherwise, our responses to secularism will be ill informed and not be able to 
move beyond stereotypes and prejudices, such as the uncritical acceptance of  the secular master narrative. 
As a result, our mission to this society will be misdirected. 
Eberhard Jungel pointedly formulated the response required of the Christian: we must understand 
the secular age  better than it understands itself.45  This means that we must go  beyond the received 
wisdom and question the secular narratives if  we want to formulate a meaningful response to modern 
secularity. There are many possible areas of  engagement for this. I have to restrict myself to two areas that 
arise from the paper. First, I am going to address the issue of  the way in which our language relates to 
God. This will lead to surprising applications. Second, I shall address the issue of  modern self-assertion 
as identified by Hans Bumenberg. This, too, has interesting implication for the Church's response to 
contemporary debates. 
If  we take seriously the implication of  the shift towards univocal language with regard to God's being, 
then we will need to address the potential inadequacy of  our theological modes of  speech, in particular 
the univocal mode which reduces God to a being among beings. I don't believe that a return to a 
repristinated Thomist analogical understanding of  religious language, as it is attempted by a group of 
theologians known as Radical Orthodoxy,46 is helpful here-this denies important other elements of  the 
modern self-understanding, in particular with regard to the relation between faith and knowledge. In 
contrast, Schleiermacher's grounding of  religious knowledge in experience is much more helpful here, 
or Bonhoeffer's grounding of  theology in the experience of  the presence of  Christ in the Church.  47 The 
precise shape of  the response does not matter here, as it is the interaction with secular thought that is 
important. However, I believe, that a consistently trinitarian theology, including a strong sense of  the 
presence of Christ in the Church, should be the foundation of a genuinely Christian response. This 
would also address the often heard observation that worship, in order to be meaningful for the current 
generation, needs to be experientially based. A theology of  the presence of  Christ, together with a liturgy 
that expresses this, would go a long way to address this. 
With regard to Blumenberg's identification of  theological absolutism that led to the need for human 
self-assertion, a possible response could be to develop a theology of creation that allows for divine 
providence and divine maintenance of  creation in a meaningful manner-the focus exclusively on human 
responsibility in contemporary ecological thinking is precisely a continuation of  the movement toward 
human self-affirmation that Blumenberg describes-but which also allows for human cooperation and 
responsibility, within a framework of  confidence in God's creative and maintaining action. 
45 
Michael  Murrmann-Kahl (  "Mysterium  Trinitatis"? Fal/studien zur Trinitatslehre in der Evangelischen Dogmatik des 20.  Jahrhunderts, 
Berlin; New York, De Gruyter, 1997, p. 1  09) quotes Junge I as saying this. I have heard Junge I saying during a lecture course in 1993, but 
have not been able to find it in his writings. 
46 
John Milbank et al.,  Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology,  London, Routledge,  1999. 
Bonhoeffer,  Christology,  London,  Collins,  1966. The  recent critical edition  is Dietrich  Bonhoeffer, 'Lectures  on  Christology',  in 
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Without such in-depth engagement, the temptation is great either to use our good works in the 
of  social justice as the justification for our existence, or to follow the winning formula 
Pentecostalism. However, neither route enables us to bear that witness to which we are bound by 
inheritance, not least as it is expressed in the Basis of  Union.  Consequently, if  we want to be true 
ourselves, we must take the long and difficult route of critical engagement with our ~v.""-'"f-'V' 
society and culture. In doing so, we will discover resources and riches within our inheritance 
we otherwise would have been unaware. 